Lawyer Profile
Catherine Pariseault
Montréal, Québec
Overview
In the Henry decision rendered on January 16, 2026,1 the Professions Tribunal reiterated what framework applies to a guilty plea in disciplinary matters. In this case, the professional had pleaded guilty during his conviction hearing. After having ascertained that his pleas were made freely and voluntarily, the Disciplinary Council of the Ordre des dentistes (the “Council”) declared him guilty. However, the Council had not ensured that the professional admitted to the facts relating to the key elements of the offences at issue. During the penalty hearing, the professional raised questions about his guilty pleas. Although the Council had considered whether his pleas were valid and whether to withdraw them and return the case to a conviction hearing, the hearing continued and penalties were imposed on the professional. On appeal of the Council’s decision, the Professions Tribunal concluded that the Council had erred in accepting the professional’s guilty pleas when it had become clear that he denied the facts put forward in support of the charges against him. The Professions Tribunal concluded that the Disciplinary Council of the Ordre des dentistes had erred in accepting the appellant’s guilty plea when it had become clear that he denied the facts put forward in support of the charges against him. The Professions Tribunal reasons were based on the following: The Professional Code2 contains no specific provisions governing the entering of a guilty plea.3 In the absence of specific rules, disciplinary law can draw inspiration from the criteria developed in criminal and penal law.4 By pleading guilty, the professional waives their right to a formal investigation and associated procedural safeguards.5 Pleading guilty is a significant decision in disciplinary proceedings, as it inevitably brings the investigation to a close and has detrimental consequences on the professional who pleads guilty.6 This decision serves as a reminder of the two-prong test7 a Disciplinary Council must use to accept a guilty plea: Admission by the professional: The professional must have formally admitted to the key legal elements of the offence.8 To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal and made with full knowledge of its effects and consequences.9 Acceptance by the Council: The Council may only accept the plea after ensuring that the professional knows and understands the nature of the offence they are charged with and the effects of their guilty plea. The Council must also confirm that the professional admits to the facts relating to the key elements of the offence in question.10 This decision also introduces the requirement to submit a joint statement of the facts11 or provide an account of the facts that led to the offences in order to properly contextualize them.12 Failure to comply with these requirements could result in the professional’s guilty plea being contested or dismissed by the Disciplinary Council. More recently in the Fernandez decision,13 the Disciplinary Council of the College des médecins was called upon to rule on whether the requirements of the Henry decision applied, in particular regarding the filing of a joint statement or account of the facts giving rise to the offences. In this case, the Council had taken cognizance of the Henry decision after having accepted the professional’s guilty plea, and no joint statement had been filed. After allowing the parties to present their observations, the Council declared itself satisfied with the parties’ claims that the Fernandez case differed from the Henry case in that Dr. Fernandez had admitted to the facts relating to the essential elements of the charge, that he had filed a 17-page statement, and that the Syndic had filed documents containing the accounts of eight patients. It will be interesting to follow how case law will develop on this issue to confirm what direction the various disciplinary councils will take. The members of Lavery’s professional and disciplinary law team regularly represent professional orders and professionals. They are available to advise you and answer your questions. Summary A guilty plea may expedite the disciplinary process, but it has the effect of depriving the accused professional of certain procedural safeguards. It is important to ensure that the conditions of validity and acceptance of a guilty plea are met, otherwise it may be dismissed or overturned on appeal. Summary evidence must be taken before a professional pleads guilty, whether it be through the filing of a joint statement of facts, the presentation of an account of the facts by one of the parties or the submission of documentary evidence. Henry c. Dentistes (Ordre professionnel des), 2026 QCTP 1 2 CQLR C-26. Henry c. Dentistes (Ordre professionnel des), 2026 QCTP 1, para. 24 Id. Id. Id., para. 27 Id., para. 25 Id., para. 26 Id., para. 28 Id., para. 27 and 29. Id., para. 30 Id., para. 31 Médecins (Ordre professionnel des) c. Fernandez, 2026 QCCDMD 5
In a decision rendered on September 1, 20221, the Court of Appeal of Quebec stated that a judge seized of an application for authorization for treatment must ensure that the patient in question can be heard and assert their rights. The Court also took the opportunity to analyze the indefinite hospitalization clauses and the re-hospitalization clauses made necessary following a subsequent deterioration in a patient’s health. Legal representation of patients The Court’s reasoning was based on the following elements: Article 90 C.C.P. allows the judge to appoint a lawyer ex officio to safeguard the rights and interests of an incapable person; A hearing on an application for authorization for treatment should not be held without the person who is the subject of the application being represented by a lawyer; The principle that such a person should be represented by a lawyer may have certain exceptions, but it can only be discarded after steps have been taken to offer the person involved the presence of a lawyer, following a close consideration of the stakes and circumstances of the case and of a decision expressly reasoned by the judge. As such, when an application for authorization for treatment is presented, the following analytical framework must be applied from the start of the hearing: The judge must assess whether the person concerned is incapable. To meet this first requirement, preliminary evidence of “likelihood of incapacity” must be provided2; The appointment of a lawyer must be necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of the person3 When these conditions are met, the judge must suspend the proceedings under article 160 C.C.P. for the period necessary for a lawyer to be appointed to represent the patient. The court may also issue a safeguard order. If the judge is not convinced that the second condition is met, they can withhold their decision and hear the evidence. Once the evidence has been adduced, they can decide to issue a safeguard order if the steps are met or decide on the merits of the application if this second criterion has not been met. In the latter case, they must expressly state the reasons which led them to this conclusion. The Court pointed out that prior to a hearing, a healthcare establishment must make sure that everything is done to ensure that the person concerned has the possibility of being represented by a lawyer. The bench is also of the view that the presence of an available lawyer at treatment hearings would be an ideal practice in order to allow the judge to appoint them ex officio. Hospitalization and re-hospitalization clauses In this case, the patient challenged the finding that they must remain hospitalized from the delivery of the judgment authorizing their treatment until their medical discharge. The court pointed out that in the absence of appropriate evidence, it is not up to the Court to usurp the role of the medical profession by setting a term for an ongoing hospitalization. The court maintained the order’s conclusion that the patient’s hospitalization should continue “until the attending physician deems [the patient’s] condition has sufficiently stabilized to allow them to be discharged safely.” Finally, the patient also challenged the conclusion of the judgment relating to their re-hospitalization in the event of non-collaboration with treatment. The Court of Appeal clarified that a clause of this nature should not be a sanction for non-compliance with the treatment plan. A re-hospitalization clause for non-collaboration depends on the circumstances of each case and must be substantiated by appropriate evidence. However, the court does not rule out that this eventuality may justify the re-hospitalization of a patient if evidence to this effect is presented. The members of Lavery’s Administrative Law team regularly represent healthcare establishments and remain available to advise you and answer your questions in connection with this new development in jurisprudence. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 Para. 33 et seq. Para. 49 et seq.
The Supreme Court recently considered, in the Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz1 decision, the applicable test to determine whether a delay is inordinate and constitutes an abuse of process that could lead to a stay of administrative proceedings. In this case, a Saskatchewan lawyer requested that the disciplinary proceedings against him be terminated due to a delay that he claimed was inordinate and constituted an abuse of process. The Law Society of Saskatchewan’s inquiry had begun six years before his application was filed. After analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no abuse of process. In its study of the question of delay, the Supreme Court recalled that the analytical framework for determining whether a delay constitutes an abuse of process remains that which was developed by the Supreme Court in the Blencoe2 decision rendered twenty years earlier. In this way, the majority rejected the idea of bringing a test akin to the Jordan3 decision regarding inordinate delay into the context of administrative proceedings. Here is the analysis grid for determining whether a delay constitutes an abuse of process: The delay must be inordinate. Contextual factors must be considered, such as the nature and purpose of the proceedings, the length and causes of the delay and the complexity of the facts and issues in the case. Moreover, if the party itself caused or waived the delay, then it cannot amount to an abuse of process. The delay must have caused significant prejudice directly. It could, for example, be psychological harm, a damaged reputation, sustained media attention or loss of business. If these first two conditions are met, the delay in question constitutes an abuse of process when it is manifestly unfair to a party or otherwise brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Thus, once the abuse of process has been established, several remedies are possible depending on the seriousness of the harm suffered. These can range, in particular, from the reduction of the sanction and the ruling against the organization at fault to pay all costs to the stay of the proceedings. The members of Lavery’s Administrative Law team regularly represent various professional orders and remain available to advise you and answer your questions in connection with this new development in jurisprudence. 2022 SCC 29, July 8, 2022. Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44. R v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27.
Practice Areas
Bar Information
Called to the bar: 2012 (QC)